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35 
SUBMERSIBLES AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Brian Wilson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard approached a crudely constructed, 
aqua-blue vessel, containing nearly six tons of cocaine.1  The four 
crewmen aboard the self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS)2 appeared 
to be well aware that they could avoid criminal prosecution if they 
destroyed all evidence of their drug trafficking before law enforcement 
officials arrived.3  As the boarding team neared the SPSS, the crew 
opened the scuttling valves to sink the fiber-glassed submersible.4  
However, the Coast Guard was fortunate in this case; the crewmembers 
were unable to scuttle the eleven bales of cocaine valued at more than 
$350 million, though they did manage to sink their vessel before the 
boarding team arrived.5   
                                            
 * Brian Wilson is the Deputy Director of the Global Maritime Operational Threat 
Response Coordination Center (GMCC), a Department of Homeland Security office 
within the U.S. Coast Guard, and is an adjunct professor of maritime security at the U.S. 
Naval Academy.  He previously served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, retiring in the 
rank of Captain. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the U.S. Coast Guard or the Departments of Homeland 
Security or Defense.  He may be reached at brianstwilson@gmail.com. 
 1. John Otis, High Seas Drug Bust, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 24, 2007, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5080002.html. 
 2. SPSS refers to self-propelled semi-submersibles; SPFS refers to self-propelled 
fully-submersibles.  For purposes of this article only, the term SPSS may refer to both 
SPSS and SPFS vessels.  Definitions of SPSS and SPFS are provided in the Drug 
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, discussed in detail below.   
 3. Otis, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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The interdiction,6 while successful, underscored two gaps in U.S. 
drug trafficking law at the time:  first, that drug smugglers could skirt 
prosecution if law enforcement officials failed to recover evidence of 
illegal activity; and, second, that the existing enforcement structure did 
not account for the national security danger that a new vehicle—the 
SPSS—presented.  The ensuing legislative action to close these gaps is a 
narrative regarding the illicit narcotics industry, its intersection with 
other threats, and the law.   
The use of submersibles by traffickers is on the rise and presents a 
transnational security threat.7  From 2001 through 2010, approximately 
175 documented drug transits from South America to global destinations 
occurred on SPSS-type platforms.8  While transporting illicit cargo in the 
maritime domain is not new, the stealthy SPSS—a long-range vessel that 
is extremely difficult to identify and track—raised significant national 
security concerns.9  “If [SPSS vessels] can smuggle drugs, what else can 
they smuggle?” asked Drug Enforcement Administration spokesman 
Rusty Payne.10  In 2008, Congressman Daniel E. Lungren of California 
asserted that the SPSS is one of the most “‘significant threats we face in 
                                            
 6. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines 
“interdiction in support of law enforcement” as: “activities conducted to divert, disrupt, 
delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, aircraft, people, 
cargo, and money.”  DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF 
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 167 (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.  The Joint Staff publication defines “drug interdiction” 
as: “[a] continuum of events focused on interrupting illegal drugs smuggled by air, sea, or 
land.  Normally consists of several phases – cueing, detection, sorting, monitoring, 
interception, handover, disruption, endgame, and apprehension – some of which may 
occur simultaneously.”  Id. at 103.   
 7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/cne-annualreport-2010.pdf. 
 8. See id; see also Captain Wade F. Wilkenson, U.S. Navy, A New Underwater 
Threat, PROC. MAG., Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-
10/new-underwater-threat (discussing the emergence of self-propelled semi-submersibles 
in the 1990s). 
 9. See Brief of United States of America at 15, United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, 
Nos. 09-14475-CC, 09-14525-CC, 09-14577-CC, 09-14578-CC 2010, WL 4057770 
(11th Cir. May 3, 2010) [hereinafter Brief of United States of America, United States v. 
Campaz-Guerrero] (“Submersible and semi-submersible vessels are submarine-like boats 
that skim just below the surface of water [and] incorporate advanced technology, 
including a design that reduces their ability to be detected by radar and utilizing water-
cooled exhaust mufflers to reduce their heat signal.”).   
 10. Matthew Harwood, Drug War’s Rough Waters, SECURITY MGMT. (June 4, 2009), 
http://www.securitymanagement.com/print/5658. 
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maritime law enforcement today,’” but noted that without a law 
proscribing the operation of these platforms, narco-traffickers often 
avoid criminal consequences.11     
The United States closed the legal gap in 2008 with the passage of 
the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA).12  This federal 
statute criminalizes the operation of fully submersible or semi-
submersible vessels that are without nationality13 and are navigating or 
have navigated outside of a nation’s territorial sea with the intent to 
evade detection.14  Essentially, the conveyance was outlawed regardless 
of its contents. 
At present, dozens of defendants have been convicted under the 
DTVIA, yet scant legal review of DTVIA’s constitutionality, either 
academically or judicially, existed prior to four Eleventh Circuit opinions 
issued in the first half of 2011.15  In these cases, the courts considered 
whether the DTVIA exceeds congressional authority, whether its 
application violates due process, whether its text is too vague, and 
whether the statute improperly shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant.  Although limited in number, these rulings provide guidance 
for addressing other asymmetric maritime threats that are increasingly 
transnational, complex, and lethal. 
This Article examines the economic and environmental incentives 
that led to the development of semi- and fully-submersibles, the 
DTVIA’s legislative history and enactment, the issues raised in the 
                                            
 11. 154 CONG. REC. H7239 (daily ed. July 29, 2008) (statement of Rep. Daniel E. 
Lungren) (quoting testimony from the U.S. Coast Guard). 
 12. Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-407, 122 Stat. 
4296 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285 (West 2010)). 
 13. Subsection 70502(d)(1) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act classifies a 
vessel as being without nationality when:   
(A) . . . the master or individual in charge of the vessel makes a claim of registry 
that is denied by the nation whose registry is claimed; (B) . . . the master or 
individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized 
to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of 
nationality or registry; [or] (C) . . . the master or individual in charge makes a 
claim of registry and the claim nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally 
assert that the vessel is of its nationality.   
46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(d)(1) (West 2010).  In addition, a vessel is without nationality if it 
sails under the flag of two or more states.  Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 6, 
Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2315. 
 14. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285.  
 15. See generally United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Valarezo-
Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, Nos. 09–
14475, 09–14525, 09–14577, 09–14578, 2011 WL 1522386 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2011).   
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appellate cases that affirmed the Act’s constitutionality, and the 
unresolved legal and operational issues to address the SPSS threat.16  Part 
II details the international narco-trafficking business and the rise of the 
SPSS as a drug-smuggling tool, as well as the logistical difficulties faced 
by drug enforcement agencies.  Part III discusses the existing domestic 
and international efforts to confront the international drug trade.  Part IV 
outlines the swift congressional response to the SPSS threat—the 
DTVIA.  In turn, Part V examines the judicial review of appeals arising 
out of the DTVIA.   
II.  THE DRUG CHALLENGE 
Nearly 8,000 people a day use drugs illegally for the first time in the 
United States alone.17  And, a United Nations’ study pegs the global 
number of illicit drug users at more than 200 million and rising.18  
Supplying this market depends on smuggling illicit drugs across oceans 
and national borders and generates an estimated $320 billion annually.19  
                                            
 16. This article does not examine social policy issues related to countering illicit 
narcotics threats.    See GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS (2011), 
available at http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report, for a discussion of social 
policy issues related to drug use.  The report notes that 
[w]hen the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into being 
50 years ago, and when President Nixon launched the US government’s war on 
drugs 40 years ago, policymakers believed that harsh law enforcement action 
against those involved in drug production, distribution and use would lead to an 
ever-diminishing market in controlled drugs such as heroin, cocaine and cannabis, 
and the eventual achievement of a ‘drug free world’.  In practice, the global scale 
of illegal drug markets — largely controlled by organized crime — has grown 
dramatically over this period . . . . [Thus, t]he starting point for . . . review is the 
recognition of the global drug problem as a set of interlinked health and social 
challenges to be managed, rather than a war to be won.    
Id. at 4.  See also Jimmy Carter, Op-Ed., Call Off the Global Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/opinion/17carter.html (discussing 
the Global Commission on Drug Policy’s report). 
 17. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY 5 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/ 
ndcs2011.pdf. 
 18. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT 3 
(2008), [hereinafter 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT], available at http://www.unodc.org/ 
documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf. 
 19. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2005 WORLD DRUG REPORT 2 
(2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_web.pdf.  In 
discussing the global market for illicit drugs, the report states: “[f]or all the caveats that 
one may put on such a figure, [$320 billion] . . . it is still larger than the individual GDPs 
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Among illicit drugs, cocaine distribution is particularly lucrative.  For 
example, while the wholesale value of a kilogram of cocaine in Peru and 
Colombia is approximately $1,300 and $2,300, respectively, the same 
kilogram yields approximately $27,000 in the United States, $60,000 in 
Europe, $150,000 in Russia, and more than $170,000 in Saudi Arabia.20   
Some narcotics are produced and distributed locally and regionally, 
while others, such as cocaine, move globally.21  Transporting products to 
more profitable destinations without detection is key, and transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs) operating in South America recognize the 
value of the oceans as critical routes, given the anonymity a ship enjoys 
over large, ungoverned stretches of space, the relative complexities in 
jurisdiction, and the limited capacity of most countries’ coastal law 
enforcement.22 The oceans also pose considerable operational, 
communications, and logistics challenges.  Overcoming those hurdles 
has enabled the TCOs’ business model to remain strong even though 
more than 1.6 million drug seizure cases occurred globally in 2006 and 
1.5 million in 2005, resulting in the interdiction of more than 700 metric 
tons of cocaine, among other drugs, in each of those years.23   
                                                                                                  
of nearly 90% of the countries of the world.  This is not a small enemy against which we 
struggle.  It is a monster.”  Id. 
 20. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2010 WORLD DRUG REPORT 170 
(2010), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_ 
Report_2010_lo-res.pdf.  One maritime platform could hold more than $100 million in 
cocaine if distributed in the United States.  See Dane Schiller, Experts: ‘Nothing 
Amateur’ About Narco Submarine, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 7, 2011, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7415756.html. 
 21. JEREMY HAKEN, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 3 (2011), available at http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/ 
reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_web.pdf. 
 22. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-661, HOMELAND DEFENSE: 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE DOD PLANNING AND COORDINATION FOR MARITIME 
OPERATIONS 7 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-661.  The 
report notes that    
challenges unique to the maritime domain include the need for international 
cooperation to ensure improved transparency in the registration of vessels and 
identification of ownership, cargoes, and crew of the world’s multinational, 
multiflag merchant marine.  Environmental factors unique to the maritime domain 
also contribute to maritime domain awareness challenges, such as the vastness of 
the oceans, the great length of shorelines, and the size of port areas that can 
provide concealment and numerous access points to the land. 
Id. 
 23. 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 18, at 26.  Cannabis accounted for sixty-
five percent of the total seizures in 2006.  Id. 
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Although the cost of constructing a submersible vessel is high—
around $2 million—those costs are mitigated by the fact that such vessels 
can transport several tons of cocaine in one voyage.24   Thus, as a result 
of the tremendously higher street value of cocaine in areas outside of 
Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia, a TCO could “[d]eploy five vessels at a 
combined total lay out of $100 million, successfully deliver one, and you 
double your investment.”25 
Stopping vessels before they get underway is certainly preferable, 
but because the construction and deployment of SPSS platforms occur in 
rough, rural, and isolated terrain, doing so is not always possible.26 This 
is, in part, due to the fact that smugglers are “constantly adapting their 
techniques to counter U.S. law enforcement activities.”27  Consequently, 
identifying and tracking illicit vessels on millions of nautical miles of 
ocean space poses multiple operational challenges, because “traffickers 
have created intricate . . . methods involving multiple at-sea transfers 
between commercial and fishing vessels, complex logistics chains along 
circuitous routes, and extensive use of decoy vessels to confuse 
interdiction forces.”28  
In addition, TCOs modified where they operate.  Admiral James G. 
Stavridis, former Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in prepared 
remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated: 
In 2008, we observed that traffickers had expanded their 
presence in West Africa as a springboard to Europe, while also 
exploring new Middle Eastern and Asian markets.  We also 
noted that traffickers have shifted from high seas routes to multi-
staging tactics along the Central American littorals, attempting to 
evade international interdiction efforts.29   
                                            
 24. See Wilkenson, supra note 8.  
 25. Id. 
 26. John Otis & Bahia Malaga, The Cocaine Wars: Invasion of the Drug Submarines, 
TIME, Mar. 29, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2061934,00.html. 
(“The subs are . . . a testament to the ingenuity of traffickers working at secluded dry 
docks deep inside the equatorial jungles.”).  
 27. OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra 
note 7, at 8.  See also Otis & Malaga, supra note 26 (“Colombian traffickers have now 
taken ‘a quantum leap in technology . . . . It’s the difference between building a motor-
scooter and building a car,’” said Jay Bergman of the Drug Enforcement Administration). 
 28. Wilkenson, supra note 8. 
 29. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations For Fiscal Year 2010: 
Hearings Before the Comm. on Armed Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Admiral 
James G. Stavridis), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg52620/ 
html/CHRG-111shrg52620.htm. 
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Thus, successful pursuit of TCOs involves more than just 
interdicting illicit drugs: “it is widely understood that groups engaging in 
drug trafficking also engage in other sorts of violent and criminal 
enterprise, from mass murders and human smuggling in Mexico, to the 
funding of militant insurgents and terrorists such [as] Al Qaeda, the 
FARC in Colombia, and possibly Hezbollah in Lebanon.”30 
III.  LEGAL BASIS FOR CURRENT OPERATIONAL COOPERATION AND 
JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES 
Although the DTVIA proscribes operating a stateless submersible 
internationally with the intent to evade detection (but does not expressly 
proscribe drug trafficking), existing legal authority, as well as 
international cooperation and operational action against narco-trafficking 
over the past century, are critical components of the Act’s development.   
A.  Existing Legal Authorities  
The 1912 International Opium Convention represents the first 
multilateral counter-narcotics treaty,31 and more recently, the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) 
addressed drugs, providing that “[a]ll States shall co-operate in the 
suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international 
conventions.”32  The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances contains guidance 
                                            
 30. HAKEN, supra note 21, at 3.  
 31. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No. 612, 8 
L.N.T.S. 187.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime stated the 1912 
International Opium Convention was 
far from perfect, but it contained many elements of a comprehensive drug control 
treaty. Moreover, as an official declaration on the dangerous practices of opium 
smoking and the non-medical trade in opium and other drugs, it had value as an 
advocacy tool. It also inspired national drug control legislation, such as the 1913 
Harrison Act in the United States, the foundation of U.S. drug law in the 20th 
century. 
U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, The 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, U.N. 
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/the-1912-hague-
international-opium-convention.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2011). 
 32. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 108, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 (“Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its flag is 
engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may request the co-
operation of other States to suppress such traffic.”).  
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regarding partnering and cooperation and requires state parties to 
establish criminal offenses for the production, manufacture, sale, 
distribution, delivery, importation, and exportation of narcotic drugs.33  
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its protocol,34 as 
well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, also provide 
guidance on illicit drug repression.35   
In the United States, multiple agencies work to counter the drug 
threat, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, 
Justice, and State.36  Within those agencies, the Joint Interagency Task 
Force South,37 the U.S. Coast Guard,38 and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration39 have particularly influential roles.  
                                            
 33. U.N. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Illicit 
Trafficking].  Article 17 provides, in part, that “[p]arties shall co-operate to the fullest 
extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea, in conformity with the international law 
of the sea.”  Id. at 517. 
 34. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, May 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 
U.N.T.S. 204, available at http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/convention_1961_en.pdf. 
 35. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, 
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf.  
 36. See CURT A. KLUN, WAR ON DRUGS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 35 YEARS OF 
FIGHTING ASYMMETRIC THREATS 3 n.10 (2010), available at 
http://www.pnsr.org/data/images/klun%20-%20war%20on%20drugs%20-
%20lessons%20learned%20from%2035%20years%20of%20fighting%20asymmetric%2
0threats.pdf (examining interagency cooperation and challenges in counter-drug 
operations).  
 37. See generally Evan Munsing & Christopher J. Lamb, Inst. for Nat’l Strategic 
Studies, Joint Interagency Task Force-South:  The Best Known, Least Understood 
Interagency Success (2011), available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/strategic-
perspectives/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf  (“Joint Interagency Task Force-South . . . is 
well known within the U.S. Government as the ‘gold standard’ for interagency 
cooperation and intelligence fusion.”).  In 2009, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South 
“accounted for more than 40 percent of global cocaine interdiction. . . . [And] the 
disruption of approximately 220 tons of cocaine.”  Id. at 3.   
 38. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2006) (authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to stop and board 
any vessel on the high seas without a warrant, provided the vessel is “subject to the 
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States.”). 
 39. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., DEA Mission Statement, U.S. DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (last visited July 
26,  2011) (“The mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is to enforce 
the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and to bring to the 
criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, 
those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, 
manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit 
traffic in the United States.”).  See generally KLUN, supra note 36 (detailing the role of 
the DEA).    
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Domestic guidance for boarding authorities includes an array of 
statutes, case law, and ship boarding agreements between the United 
States and more than thirty other nations.40  However, the seminal U.S. 
criminal statute on narcotics trafficking is the Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act (MDLEA),41 which addresses nexus42 and jurisdiction, 
among other issues.  Although the MDLEA superseded the Marijuana on 
the High Seas Act (MHSA),43 both Acts enabled prosecutions for illicit 
conduct occurring beyond the U.S. territorial sea on vessels that may or 
may not be registered in the United States, recognizing the global drug 
                                            
 40. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); 14 U.S.C. § 89; 10 U.S.C. § 124 (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 
801-971 (2006); 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (2006); 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70507; 21 U.S.C. § 959 
(2006).  See also 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(2) (“In order to promote such cooperation, the 
President is authorized to conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime 
agreements, with other countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, 
transportation, and distribution of narcotics analgesics, including opium and its 
derivatives, other narcotic and psychotropic drugs, and other controlled substances.”); 
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking, supra note 33, at 517 (with regard to ship 
boarding agreements, “the Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or regional 
agreements or arrangements to carry out, or to enhance the effectiveness of, the 
provisions of this article.”). 
 41. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70507.  The MDLEA was passed in 1986 and subsequently 
amended.  Id. 
 42. The issue of nexus is beyond the scope of this Article; however, for an extensive 
discussion of the nexus requirement, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-
166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (2010), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/94-166_20100326.pdf.   
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (2006).  See also Joseph R. Brendel, The Marijuana on the 
High Seas Act and Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 313, 
313-314 (1983) (“The United States government has been conducting a campaign against 
drug abuse and narcotics trafficking since 1914.  In the mid-1970’s, the federal 
government extended its campaign beyond the territorial limits of the United States and 
began to fight its drug war on the high seas. As a result, United States Coast Guard 
seizures of drug-laden vessels increased dramatically during the 1970’s.  Prosecutions 
actually declined, however, as drug smugglers quickly discovered a loophole in the law. . 
. . [U]nless prosecutors could prove that the crewmembers were attempting or conspiring 
to import illicit narcotics into the United States, the prosecutions failed.  Upon boarding 
drug-laden vessels, Coast Guard authorities often found that crewmembers had destroyed 
any evidence that might have supported a conspiracy prosecution, such as charts marked 
with United States destinations.”).  Enactment of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act 
closed this gap.   Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s 
Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1191, 1198 (2009) (“The main relevant innovation of the MHSA was to extend U.S. 
jurisdiction on the high seas not just to ‘U.S. vessels,’ but also to a new category, ‘vessels 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’ . . . Thus, the [MHSA] swept in cases 
involving foreigners on the high seas, on non-American vessels, without proof that the 
vessel or cargo was destined for America.”). 
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threat and the “difficulty of catching traffickers in the relatively short 
time they are in U.S. waters [as well as the need for] enforcement . . . far 
from its shores.”44  Both Acts also stoked considerable academic and 
judicial review.45 
The MDLEA establishes jurisdiction for U.S. law enforcement 
officials over: the trafficking of controlled substances that occurs on the 
high seas and in a foreign state’s territorial sea, with the consent of the 
coastal nation;46 U.S. registered vessels; foreign-flagged vessels with the 
consent of the flag state;47 and stateless vessels.48   The MDLEA thus 
created a framework to enable U.S. prosecutions, under certain 
conditions, for maritime drug trafficking occurring virtually anywhere on 
earth.  
The MDLEA provides that “[j]urisdiction with respect to a vessel 
subject to this chapter is not an element of an offense.  Jurisdictional 
issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be 
determined solely by the trial judge.”49  President Clinton remarked in a 
signing statement on October 19, 1996, that 
                                            
 44. Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 1197. 
 45. Id.  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 
334 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 2003); Jennifer J. Berthiaume, Note, United States v. Juda: Fifth 
Amendment Due Process and Stateless Vessels on the High Seas, 73 B.U. L. REV. 477 
(1993); James A. Tate, Comment, Eliminating the Nexus Obstacle to the Prosecution of 
International Drug Traffickers on the High Seas, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 267 (2008); 
Stephanie M. Chaissan, Comment, “Minimum Contacts” Abroad: Using the International 
Shoe Test to Restrict the Extraterritorial Exercise of United States Jurisdiction Under the 
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 641 (2007).  
 46. MDLEA “applies even though the act is committed outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.”  46 U.S.C. § 70503(b).  The Act details vessels subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction: 
(A) a vessel without nationality; (B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without 
nationality under paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas; (C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented or 
waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United States; (D) 
a vessel in the customs waters of the United States; (E) a vessel in the territorial 
waters of a foreign nation if the nation consents to the enforcement of United 
States law by the United States; and (F) a vessel in the contiguous zone of the 
United States, as defined in Presidential Proclamation 7219 of September 2, 1999. 
Id. § 70502(c)(1).  See also id. § 70502(d) (discussing the definition of vessels without 
nationality). 
 47. See id. § 70502(c)(1)(C). 
 48. Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A).  See also id. § 70502(d). 
 49. Id. § 70504(a). 
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[t]he Act makes clear that persons arrested in international 
waters will not be able to challenge the arrest on the ground that 
the vessel was of foreign registry unless such claim was 
affirmatively and unequivocally verified by the nation of registry 
when the vessel was targeted for boarding.  By eliminating this 
commonly raised jurisdictional defense, the Act strengthens the 
hand of prosecutors in drug smuggling cases.50    
Additionally, passage of the MDLEA provided clarity regarding the 
status of the vessel, a fundamental issue in any criminal proceeding 
based on illicit conduct on the high seas.51  
Defendants interdicted on the high seas on stateless vessels have 
repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, raised jurisdictional challenges.  Most 
recently, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Caicedo, a MDLEA case, 
found that “[b]ecause stateless vessels do not fall within the veil of 
another sovereign’s territorial protection, all nations can treat them as 
their own territory and subject them to their laws.”52  The court reasoned 
that “[t]he radically different treatment afforded to stateless vessels as a 
matter of international law . . . is [not] . . .  arbitrary or unfair.”53  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Juda found that a nexus 
between a defendant and the United States was not needed for the United 
                                            
 50. Presidential Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, 32 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2112 (Oct. 19, 1996).  
 51. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d).  A vessel registered in a state enjoys the protections, along 
with the responsibilities, of that particular state.  See generally Craig H. Allen, Revisiting 
the Thames Formula:  The Evolving Role of the International Maritime Organization and 
Its Member States in Implementing the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 10 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L. J. 265, 321 (2009) (“The LOS Convention assigns the primary responsibility for 
exercising such jurisdiction and control to the vessel’s flag State.  It then prescribes the 
performance standards the flag State must meet: it must exercise that jurisdiction and 
control “‘effectively.’”); see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 32, 
at 433.  The LOS Convention and customary international law generally provide 
exclusive jurisdiction to a state for ships flying its flag, though several exceptions exist.  
See id. at 438-39 (interference may “derive from powers conferred by treaty”); see 
generally James Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of 
Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 1 (2010).  In contrast, an 
unregistered vessel or one claiming registry in two states is a stateless vessel that enjoys 
virtually no protection and may be assimilated to the laws of the interdicting state.  See 
generally United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 
F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 52. Caicedo, 47 F.3d at 373. 
 53. Id. at 372. 
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States to prosecute crimes committed by stateless vessels.54  To hold 
otherwise, the court reasoned, would allow such vessels to become 
“floating sanctuaries from authority.”55 
Jurisdictional clarity is significant in legally combating cocaine 
transits, which, along with heroin, comprise the majority of long-distance 
trafficking.56  Other drugs are primarily sold either domestically or 
regionally, but the surging use of the SPSS to transport drugs, along with 
the possibility of other illicit cargo, prompted legislative interest.57   
B.  Collaboration 
Successful pursuit of submersibles requires multilateral collaboration 
because the operating environment is simply too large for any nation to 
address individually.58  Similarly, partnering against narco-trafficking is 
critical and unfolds in multiple forums.59  Although language barriers, 
training, equipment, and the level of political support represent 
challenges, a shared commitment exists in combating drug trafficking.   
In addition, domestic legal authority and judicial capacity are critical 
to effectively pursuing narco-traffickers and other illicit maritime 
threats.60 Some countries, like the United States and Colombia, have 
                                            
 54. Juda, 46 F.3d at 967 
 55. Id.  See also United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a ship with both Colombian and Panamanian flags was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States); United States v. Martinez, No. 05-14533, 2006 WL 
2974135 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a vessel with no indicia of nationality was 
properly deemed to be a vessel without nationality); United States v. Matute, 767 F.2d 
1511 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a ship sailing under the authority of two nations was a 
vessel without nationality).  
 56. HAKEN, supra note 21, at 3.  Amphetamine-type stimulants and cannabis are also 
trafficked internationally.  Id. 
 57. 154 CONG. REC. H7239 (2008) (Statement of Rep. Daniel E. Lungren) (“These 
submersible and semi-submersible vessels . . . . usually carry between 5 and 6 tons of 
illicit cargo, everything from drugs, guns, people, and potentially weapons of mass 
destruction.”).  
 58. International Drug Control Cooperation, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/99ndcs/iv-h.html (last visited June 
19, 2011).  
 59. Id.  See also Santo Domingo Pact Strengthens Regional Cooperation to Fight 
Drugs and Crime in the Caribbean, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (Mar. 
10, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/santo-domingo-pact-strengthens-
regional-cooperation-to-fight-drugs-and-crime-in-the-caribbean-.html.  
 60. Colombian Navy Admiral Edgar Cely stated:  “[t]his enemy is supremely 
intelligent and has lots of money.  It shows that the narco-traffickers are betting on [the 
SPSS].”  Fact Sheet: Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE 
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enacted legislation to criminalize the operation of self-propelled semi- 
and fully-submersibles, but most countries have not.  Operationally, 
Colombia and Ecuador, among other nations, have partnered to seize 
submersibles.61  
Representatives from the United States and Central and South 
American nations meet twice a year (and more frequently on a bilateral 
basis) to discuss counter-drug operations and legal authorities.62   
Separately, the International Drug Enforcement Conference, led by the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and held annually, is considered a 
“major contributor to international cooperation and capacity building.”63 
                                                                                                  
SOUTH, http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2008/07/18/17/Hall-SPSS-
factsheet.source.prod_affiliate.91.pdf.  Colombian Navy Captain Gustavo Angel 
remarked:  “What’s most striking is the logistical capacity of these criminals to take all 
this material into the heart of the jungle, including heavy equipment like propulsion gear 
and generators.”  Id.  However, the SPSS and SPFS threats are not the first time narco-
traffickers have exploited legal gaps.  In a review of a criminal act targeting drug 
trafficking in the 1970s, a legal commentator remarked that 
Coast Guard authorities often found that crewmembers had destroyed any evidence 
that might have supported a conspiracy prosecution, such as charts marked with 
United States destinations.  Narcotics traffickers further exploited the . . . loophole 
by successfully employing a “mother ship” technique, anchoring large vessels 
loaded with marijuana just beyond the territorial waters of the United States.  
Under the cover of darkness, smugglers transferred the marijuana to smaller 
pleasure craft capable of unloading the cargo in shallow, isolated coves along the 
coastline.  Although the Coast Guard seized many mother ships, the government 
often could not gather sufficient evidence to prove that the crewmembers had 
conspired to import the drugs into the United States. 
Brendel, supra note 43, at 314. 
 61. See Schiller, supra note 20; OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 7, at 8; Munsing & Lamb, supra note 37, at 74. 
 62. BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: VOLUME 1 DRUG AND 
CHEMICAL CONTROL 13, 49-50 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/156575.pdf.  The Multilateral Counterdrug Summit seeks  
to identify and implement measures by which partner nation entities and the [U.S. 
government] . . . can cooperate to combat maritime drug trafficking through 
interdiction and delivery of consequences in smuggling cases.  The success of 
these summits is dependent on the continued participation and cooperation of 
partner nation counterparts to facilitate regional counterdrug interoperability. 
Id. at 238.  See also U.S. COAST GUARD, REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 9 (2011), available at http://www.uscg.mil/ 
legal/Home_doc/ABA_Report.pdf, which notes that a multilateral “emerging legal 
issues” working group “was by far the most successful engagement in recent years, 
attracting representatives from 10 Central and South American Countries.” 
 63. OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED 
CRIME: ADDRESSING CONVERGING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 25 (2011), available 
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Such partnering supports the U.S. strategy to combat Transnational 
Organized Crime (TOC).64  The U.S. strategy states that TOC threatens  
the security and well-being of people around the world and 
jeopardizes the functioning of the global economy. . . .  The 
United States will leverage all possible areas of cooperation . . . 
to obtain the assistance of international partners and to raise 
international criminal justice, border security, and law 
enforcement standards and norms.65  
The strategy also discusses counter drug efforts, stating:  
In recent years, new developments in technology and 
communications equipment have enabled TOC networks 
involved in drug trafficking and other illicit activities to plan, 
coordinate, and perpetrate their schemes with increased mobility 
and anonymity. . . . The United States will continue to 
aggressively target the nexus among TOC networks involved in 
drug trafficking, terrorist groups, piracy on the high seas, and 
arms traffickers.66   
Because the operating space of TOC networks includes land, sea, and air, 
effectively confronting TOC networks involves navigating multiple 
environments and jurisdictions.  Addressing these varied challenges 
highlights the importance of collaborative information sharing between 
agencies and foreign nations, as well as partnering in operational and 
judicial capacities.   
                                                                                                  
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_ 
Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf. 
[The International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC)] brings the top drug law 
enforcement leaders and senior investigators from over 100 nations to a single 
venue where yearly agendas are set for cooperation, intelligence sharing, and case 
prioritization.  IDEC—the world’s largest international drug law enforcement 
conference—has produced concrete results year after year.  During the 
conferences, DEA and partner nations jointly develop plans to build greater law 
enforcement and investigatory capacity.  In addition, host nation personnel and 
U.S. law enforcement exchange information on priority investigatory targets. 
Id. 
 64. Id. at 24. 
 65. Id. at 26. 
 66. Id. at 24.  See also OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY 77 (2010), available at http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/ndcs2010.pdf (“The 
United States seeks to work bilaterally as well as on a regional or multilateral basis. . . . 
Experience has shown that drug-trafficking organizations are resilient, but experience has 
also shown that long-term international initiatives can and will produce real results that 
benefit the citizens of the United States as well as international partners abroad.”). 
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At the tactical level, the Department of Defense-led Joint 
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) provides an important 
venue for operational counter-drug partnering with multiple nations.67  
JIATF-South seeks to maximize “the disruption of drug transshipment, 
collecting, integrating and disseminating intelligence, and guiding 
detection and monitoring forces for tactical action”68 over their 42 
million square mile operating area.69  JIATF-South has been extremely 
effective in executing their mission and integrating multiple interagency 
and multinational partners, underscoring the value of cooperation.70 
IV.  THE SELF-PROPELLED AND SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE THREAT AND 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
The deployment of SPSS vessels by TCOs in South America to 
transport cocaine increased throughout the first decade of the twenty-first 
century.71  The low-freeboard SPSS spurred a shift in illicit narcotics 
                                            
 67. Munsing & Lamb, supra note 37, at 1.  JIATF-South includes representatives 
from, among other countries, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Great Britain, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, and 
Spain, and representatives from the United States, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and intelligence agencies.  Id. at 6.   
 68. Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted). 
 69. Id. at 29.   
 70. Id. at 27.  A JIATF-South report discussed “Don’ts” for mission success, 
including 
[d]on’t command the presence of interagency personnel on your team; [d]on’t 
segregate interagency staff in separate buildings; [d]on’t disrespect smaller 
partners, because they can make big contributions; [d]on’t demand binding 
agreements on cooperation (at least initially); [d]on’t ignore any partner’s need to 
feel they make a contribution; [d]on’t make binding decisions without substantial 
vetting and support; [d]on’t forget to build a culture of trust and empowerment; 
[and] [d]on’t take the credit for collaborative success. 
Id. at 84-85. 
 71. See OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
supra note 7, at 8.  However, illicit use of vessels operating below the surface existed 
well before the use of SPSS and SPFS:   
Although the use of [these] vessels . . . is somewhat novel in international crime, 
the threat those vessels present to the security of the United States and to the 
international community is neither new nor theoretical.  During World War II, 
German agents, who had been trained at a German sabotage school ‘in the use of 
explosives and in methods of secret writing journeyed by submarine to the beaches 
of New York and Florida, carrying large quantities of explosives and other 
sabotage devices,’ where, fortunately, they were intercepted by FBI agents.  Their 
mission had been to destroy United States’ war industries and facilities.   
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movement, representing approximately thirty percent of cocaine flow to 
the United States annually,72 and seventy percent of the cocaine leaving 
Colombia’s Pacific coast in 2009.73  Estimates compiled by the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Counternarcotics 
documented twenty-three SPSS events between fiscal years (FY) 2001-
2007, seventy-seven events in FY 2008, sixty events in FY 2009, and 
fourteen events in FY 2010.74 
Documented submersible events clearly declined in 2010, though the 
platform continues to be regularly used by TCOs and remains a 
transnational threat.75  The submersible became an attractive platform not 
just because of legal gaps, but also because of the challenges in 
identifiing and tracking such a vessel: 
The SPSS is effective because it combines the most desirable 
aspects of two historically successful methods of conveyance – 
the go-fast and the fishing vessel – while adding new dimensions 
to the drug challenge.  Similar to the go-fast, its low profile is 
difficult to detect.  Better than the go-fast, its range offers greater 
flexibility in planning potential drop locations.  Similar to a 
fishing vessel, it has the capacity to carry larger, more profitable 
payloads.  Better than a fishing vessel, traffickers launch them in 
secrecy, denying actionable intelligence that stymies counterdrug 
efforts.76  
                                                                                                  
Brief of United States of America, United States v Campaz-Guerrero, supra note 9, at 25 
n.3 (internal citations omitted). 
 72. U.S. COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD FISCAL YEAR 2009 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 22 (2010), available at http://www.uscg.mil/history/allen/docs/ 
USCG_FY09_Performance_Report.pdf (estimating that SPSS vessels carried 332 metric 
tons (731,728 pounds) in the 2009 fiscal year). 
 73. Otis & Malaga, supra note 26.   
 74. See OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
supra note 7, at 8 (recording 423 metric tons [MT] of cocaine seized in 2008, 281 MT of 
cocaine in 2009, and 71 MT of cocaine in 2010); see also U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 
62, at 22 (estimating that SPSS vessels carried 332 MT (731,728 pounds) in FY 2009).  
 75. See OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
supra note 7, at 8.  The reduction in documented SPSS events could be partially based on 
the increased operational focus by domestic law enforcement and foreign law 
enforcement efforts, as well as the passage of recent legislation providing for greater 
enforcement jurisdiction.   
 76. Wilkenson, supra note 8.   
By filling fuel tanks with seawater as they empty, they maintain a steady, ultra-low 
profile that makes them nearly impossible to spot by eye at any distance over one 
nautical mile. . . . Equipped with GPS, SPSS vessels navigate independently 
without need for external communication.  They can cruise faster than eight knots 
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Legislative debate over the DTVIA focused on the national security 
implications of difficult-to-detect platforms with extensive operational 
reach.77  Representative Lungren, a sponsor of the bill, noted that “[t]he 
potential that someone might seek to import a weapon of mass 
destruction into the United States is perhaps of the greatest concern for 
us and why we need an aggressive response to alter the calculus of 
deterrence with respect to the use of these vehicles.”78   
Representative Poe remarked:  
The U.S. Coast Guard tells us at any given time, there are 100 
. . . [SPSS vessels] on the high seas, all coming to the United 
States bringing drugs. . . . These things can bring in weapons of 
mass destruction, explosives, and work their way up the 
riverways of our Nation, going to our ports, like the Port of 
Houston and some of these other ports, and cause tremendous 
damage.  We want to capture these people on the high seas 
before they get that opportunity.79 
Representative Poe, in a press statement, further noted:  
Nothing prevents [the SPSS] from falling into the hands of 
terrorists . . . . If these vessels can carry 13 tons of cocaine, they 
can carry weapons of mass destruction just as easily.  The 
uncontrolled environment in which these vessels operate is prime 
for an act of terrorism off our coasts.80 
                                                                                                  
but tend to operate at slower speeds to minimize wake detection.  Such 
technological enhancements and tactics make the SPSS increasingly complex and 
better capable of defying surveillance and detection. 
Id.  The go-fast is similar to a SPSS in that it is small, long, narrow, and constructed of 
fiber-glass, but unlike the SPSS, the go-fast can achieve speeds of eighty miles per hour.  
Otis & Malaga, supra note 26. 
 77. 154 CONG. REC. H7239 (2008) (statement of Rep. Daniel E. Lungren). 
 78. 155 CONG. REC. H10253 (2008) (statement of Rep. Daniel E. Lungren).  
 79. Id.  Representative Poe also remarked: 
Some have said, why don’t we just shoot them out of the water as soon as we see 
them?  I guess we are too civilized for that.  We want to prosecute them instead.  
This is important legislation.  It will help our law enforcement guys, the Navy and 
U.S. Coast Guard, who are doing a tremendous job already in tracking these 
people, with cooperation from other navies throughout the world.  It is time that 
we make this legislation law. 
Id. 
 80. Press Release, Sen. Ted Poe, Poe/Lungren File Legislation to Tighten Border 
Security—At Sea Bill Outlaws Submarines Operating without Nationality (June 22, 
2008), available at http://poe.house.gov/news/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID= 
95168. 
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President George W. Bush signed the DTVIA on October 13, 2008, 
culminating an unusually fast legislative response once the relevant 
threats and legal issues were identified.81   
The legislative history regarding the DTVIA emphasizes that SPSS 
platforms “pose a formidable security threat because they are difficult to 
detect and easy to scuttle or sink.  These vessels therefore facilitate the 
destruction of evidence and hinder prosecution of smuggling offenses.”82  
Moreover, “Congress determined to criminalize not only the underlying 
conduct—whatever that conduct may be—but also traveling on the 
vessel itself.”83  
Thus, in passing the DTVIA, Congress emphasized the security 
threat posed by SPSS vessels: 
Trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious 
international problem, is universally condemned, and presents a 
threat to the security and societal well-being of the United States 
and . . . operating or embarking in a submersible vessel or semi-
submersible vessel without nationality and on an international 
voyage is a serious international problem, facilitates 
transnational crime, including drug trafficking, and terrorism, 
and presents a specific threat to the safety of maritime navigation 
and the security of the United States.84  
Accordingly, the DTVIA amended 18 U.S.C. § 2285 and provides: 
Whoever knowingly operates, or attempts or conspires to 
operate, by any means, or embarks in any submersible vessel or 
semi-submersible vessel that is without nationality and that is 
navigating or has navigated into, through, or from waters beyond 
the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a lateral 
limit of that country’s territorial sea with an adjacent country, 
with the intent to evade detection, shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.85 
                                            
 81. See Drug Trafficking Interdiction Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-407, 122 Stat. 
4296 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285 (West 2010)).  
 82. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 154 Cong. 
Rec. H7238-39 (daily ed. July 29, 2008); 154 Cong. Rec. H10153-54, H10252-54 (daily 
ed. Sept. 27, 2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-941, at 182-83 (2009); H.R. REP. NO. 110-936, at 
28 (2009)). 
 83. United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 84. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70501 (West 2010). 
 85. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285(a) (West (2010).  
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The DTVIA also amended 46 U.S.C. § 70502 with the following 
definitions: 
The term “semi-submersible vessel” means any watercraft 
constructed or adapted to be capable of operating with most of 
its hull and bulk under the surface of the water, including both 
manned and unmanned watercraft. . . . [T]he term “submersible 
vessel” means a vessel that is capable of operating completely 
below the surface of the water, including both manned and 
unmanned watercraft.86 
The DTVIA addresses “evidence of intent to evade detection” by 
providing that the “presence of any of the indicia described in [various 
sections of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act] may be 
considered, in the totality of the circumstances, to be prima facie 
evidence of intent to evade detection.”87 
Additionally, the DTVIA also provides affirmative defenses, 
including that the vessel is: 
(A) a vessel of the United States or lawfully registered in a 
foreign nation as claimed by the master or individual in charge 
of the vessel . . . ; (B) classed by and designed in accordance 
with the rules of a classification society; (C) lawfully operated in 
                                            
 86. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(f).  
 87. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285(b).  The DTVIA further provides that  
[t]he following indicia, among others, may be considered, in the totality of the 
circumstances, to be prima facie evidence that a vessel is intended to be used to 
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such an offense: (1) [t]he construction 
or adaptation of the vessel in a manner that facilitates smuggling, including—(A) 
the configuration of the vessel to ride low in the water or present a low hull profile 
to avoid being detected visually or by radar; . . . (E) the presence of materials used 
to reduce or alter the heat or radar signature of the vessel and avoid detection; . . . 
(F) the presence of a camouflaging paint scheme, or of materials used to 
camouflage the vessel, to avoid detection . . . ; (G) the display of false vessel 
registration numbers, false indicia of vessel nationality, false vessel name, or false 
vessel homeport . . . ; (4) [t]he operation of the vessel without lights during times 
lights are required to be displayed under applicable law or regulation and in a 
manner of navigation consistent with smuggling tactics used to avoid detection by 
law enforcement authorities . . . ; (5) [t]he failure of the vessel to stop or respond 
or heave to when hailed by government authority, especially where the vessel 
conducts evasive maneuvering when hailed . . . ; (6) [t]he declaration to 
government authority of apparently false information about the vessel, crew, or 
voyage or the failure to identify the vessel by name or country of registration when 
requested to do so by government authority.  
Id. § 70502(b). 
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government-regulated or licensed activity, including commerce, 
research, or exploration; or (D) equipped with and using an 
operable automatic identification system, vessel monitoring 
system, or long range identification and tracking system.88 
Enactment of the DTVIA involved the intersection of operational, 
legislative, and judicial interests.  The DTVIA represents important 
statutory authority to confront an evolving, asymmetric, and 
transnational threat that previously eluded judicial consequences.     
V.  DTVIA PROSECUTIONS, LEGAL ISSUES, AND APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues raised by prosecutions brought under the DTVIA are 
similar to many raised by the MDLEA.  Defendants have challenged the 
constitutionality of U.S. prosecutions of foreign defendants for conduct 
committed beyond the U.S. territorial seas on non-U.S.-flagged vessels; 
the scope and extent of congressional authority under the High Seas 
Clause of the Constitution;89 and whether the burden of proof is 
unlawfully shifted to the defendant.90  While not every legal issue related 
to DTVIA’s constitutionality has been litigated, the cases discussed 
below represent the sole appellate reviews of the DTVIA and warrant 
examination.91     
The defendants in Ibarguen-Mosquera were arrested after being 
detected by the United States Coast Guard Cutter Alert in international 
waters in 2009.92  With a maritime patrol aircraft providing support, an 
approaching boarding team on a rigid-hull inflatable boat observed a 
“flash of light” and “smoke or steam” from the SPSS.93  The crew 
                                            
 88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285(e).  
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power to “define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses to the Law of 
Nations”).  
 90. See, e.g., Brief of United States of America, United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, 
supra note 9, at 39-43.  Appellate courts in unrelated cases have previously addressed the 
issue of burden shifting.  See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1278-79 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (involving a “three strikes” statute); United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 
1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (involving a drug trafficking statute); United States v. McEvoy, 
820 F.2d 1170, 1173 (11th Cir. 1987) (involving a Trademark Counterfeiting Act 
prosecution); United States v. Laroche, 723 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (a Gun 
Control Act prosecution involving antique weapons).  
 91. See supra Part I. 
 92. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1377. 
 93. Id. at 1377.  
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“calmly exited the hatch, donned life-jackets, and inflated the life-
rafts.”94  Shortly thereafter, the SPSS sank and the crew awaited rescue.95  
Unlike the interdiction off the El Salvador coast discussed in Part I, 
no drugs were recovered and the vessel was not retrieved;96 thus, prior to 
DTVIA’s enactment, the crew of this stateless vessel would likely have 
avoided prosecution.  Instead, on January 13, 2009, the defendants were 
indicted on two counts of operating and conspiring to operate a semi-
submersible vessel.97  
The trial court sentenced the defendants to confinement for 108 
months.98  Three of the four appellants challenged their convictions, 
asserting the DTVIA is unconstitutional because: 
(1) its enactment exceeds Congress’s power under Article I; (2) 
the phrases “semi-submersible vessel” and “intent to evade” are 
unconstitutionally vague; (3) it shifts the burden “onto 
defendants to prove they are not engaging in drug trafficking and 
therefore denies them procedural due process; and (4) it is not 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest and 
therefore violates substantive due process.99 
Likewise, in United States v. Saac, the Eleventh Circuit considered a 
separate interdiction by the U.S. Coast Guard in international waters, 
where the crew of a SPSS also scuttled their vessel upon approach.100  
Here, too, the semi-submersible “lacked a flag, registration number, 
homeport, or navigational lights.”101  Consequently, the four defendants 
in Saac received 108 months confinement and raised similar appellate 
challenges as the defendants in Ibarguen-Mosquera.102 
The Saac and Ibarguen-Mosquera opinions were the first issued on 
the DTVIA in the Eleventh Circuit; as such, subsequent rulings in the 
Eleventh Circuit courts have held that challenges “are foreclosed by this 
Court’s recently published opinions.”103  Accordingly, the remainder of 
                                            
 94. Id.   
 95. Id.   
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.   
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1377-1378.   
 100. 632 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1207-08. 
 103. United States v. Valarezo-Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 2011).  See also 
United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, Nos. 09-14475, 09-14525, 09-14577, 09-14578, 2011 
WL 1522386, at *901 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2011).  The four appellants in Campaz-
Guerrero were convicted of violating the DTVIA for operating a stateless, semi-
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this section shall focus primarily on analysis in Saac and Ibarguen-
Mosquera.    
A.  High Seas Clause Challenges 
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court, which attached a vivid color picture 
of the aqua-blue, zero freeboard SPSS to its opinion, addressed the 
contention that Congress exceeded its power by broadly reading the High 
Seas Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress to 
“define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offences against the Law of Nations.”104  
The scope of Article I, Section 8, along with the issue of a nexus 
requirement, has also been raised in appellant challenges to MDLEA 
convictions, where defendants have contended that Congress lacks the 
authority to criminalize foreign conduct on the high seas by foreigners on 
non-U.S.-flagged vessels outside the U.S. territorial sea.105   Though 
appellants have previously raised this issue, “no published opinion deals 
squarely with the question of Congress’s Article I power over purely 
foreign ‘Felonies.’”106 
                                                                                                  
submersible in international waters with the intent to evade detection.  Id. at 900.  The 
submersible, which was approximately 195 miles off the Ecuadorian coast “had no flag, 
registration number, homeport, or navigational lights.”  Id.  As U.S. Coast Guard 
boarding officers approached the SPSS, the four defendants wearing life jackets departed 
their submersible, leaving the hatch open.  Id.  Water consumed the SPSS and it sank 
shortly thereafter.  Id.  The court said that the only issue not previously decided was 
“whether two terms in § 2285—‘semi-submersible vessel’ and ‘intent to evade’—are 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to those defendants.”  Id. at 901.  See also United 
States v. Valarezo-Orobio, 635 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2011) (also involving a scuttled 
SPSS in international waters).  The SPSS had no flag or visible markings on the platform 
when it was interdicted near Colombia in 2009.  Id. at 1262.  One of the defendants 
received about $1,525 for the transit and subsequently admitted that the vessel was semi-
submerged to evade detection.  Id. at 1263.  The defendants completely sank and 
abandoned the SPSS before the Coast Guard reached the vessel.  Id.   
 104. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. 
 105. See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 1193 (“[Although c]ourts have said MDLEA 
fits under Congress’s power to ‘define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas[,]’ [t]his raises the unexplored question of whether that provision has any 
jurisdictional limitations.”).   
 106. Id. at 1204.  See also id. at 1207-08 (“Congress has only those powers given to it.  
The question raised by the MDLEA is whether the Define and Punish Clause, and in 
particular its provisions for ‘Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,’ is an 
open-ended authorization for Congress to punish any crimes on the high seas and any 
offenses against the law of nations, regardless of whether they have a connection with the 
United States.”). 
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Counsel for appellants in Ibarguen-Mosquera asserted that 
[t]he United States Constitution simply does not allow Congress 
to punish wholly foreign conduct committed in foreign waters by 
foreign nationals on a foreign vessel. . . .  Both the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits . . . suggest that there is a limit to Congress’s 
High Seas power, and their reasoning indicates that the scope of 
the power must be a function of whether the conduct being 
regulated is generally recognized as a crime by law-abiding 
countries.  Unlike drug trafficking, operating a semi-submersible 
vessel, with the intent to evade detection, has not been 
universally condemned.107   
In Campaz–Guerrero Government counsel responded to similar 
challenges, arguing that  
[i]n enacting the Act (DTVIA), Congress . . . exercised its power 
under the High Seas Clause, and it likewise did so narrowly, 
limiting the statute’s reach to “vessels without nationality”. . . . 
Any due process concerns in this case are satisfied by the 
“protective principle” of international law . . . [permitting] “a 
nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside 
the nation’s territory threatens the nation’s security or could 
potentially interfere with the operation of its governmental 
functions.”108 
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court framed the issues as being “whether 
and in what circumstances Congress can grant extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants traveling outside of the United States territorial 
waters.”109  The two requirements to enable a law to have extraterritorial 
effect are that: (1) Congress must have stated “that it intends the law to 
have extraterritorial effect” and (2) application of the law must not be 
“‘arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’”110   
18 U.S.C.A. § 2285(c) states: “There is extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over an offense under this section . . . .”  Thus, the DTVIA’s text 
explicitly provides clarity regarding Congressional intent on the issue of 
extraterritorial application.    
                                            
 107. Appellant Ibarguen-Mosquera’s Initial Brief, at 16-18, United States v. Ibarguen-
Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 09–14476).   
 108. Brief of United States of America, United States v Campaz-Guerrero, supra note 
9, at 18, 20 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 776 F.3d 931, 938, 940-41 (11th Cir. 
1985)).  
 109. United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 110. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
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The Saac court noted that “[t]hose who engage in conduct the 
DTVIA targets threaten our nation’s security by evading detection while 
using submersible vessels to smuggle illegal drugs or other contraband, 
such as illegal weapons, from one country to another, and often into the 
United States.”111  The Saac court concluded that 
Congress acted properly within its constitutional authority under 
the High Seas Clause in passing the DTVIA.  The fact that 
defendants are challenging the constitutionality of a statute other 
than MDLEA does not alter our conclusion about the scope of 
Congress’s power under the High Seas Clause.  We declined to 
embellish one statute passed under the High Seas Clause with a 
nexus requirement.  We now decline defendants’ invitation to 
rewrite the Constitution to create one. 112   
Ibarguen-Mosquera also examined the MDLEA, prior case law, and 
the status of vessels without nationality.113  Vessels that are registered in 
a country fly the flag of that country and, as discussed above, are, as a 
general rule, subject to their exclusive jurisdiction.114  The DTVIA 
proscribes submersibles that are stateless, or without nationality, 
operating internationally with the intent to evade detection.  The 
Ibarguen-Mosquera court noted, “in the past we have held that the 
objective, protective, and territorial principles, have ‘no applicability in 
connection with stateless vessels,’ because such vessels are ‘international 
pariahs,’ that have, ‘no internationally recognized right to navigate freely 
on the high seas.’”115  
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court noted that “[b]ecause stateless vessels 
do not fall within the veil of another sovereign’s territorial protection, all 
nations can treat them as their own territory and subject them to their 
laws.”116  The court in Ibarguen-Mosquera further noted “that 
international law permits any nation to subject stateless vessels on the 
                                            
 111. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011).   
 112. Id.  
 113. See generally Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1370. 
 114. Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 6, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2315. 
 115. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1379 (quoting United States v. Marino-Garcia, 
697 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982)).  Moreover, registering a vessel in a State carries 
responsibilities and obligations, as well as certain benefits, whereas being in a stateless 
status denies a platform flag state privileges and protections; thus, “[t]he registration of 
ships is essential to the maintenance of order on the high seas.” See Brendel, supra note 
43, at 332.  
 116. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1379 (quoting United States v. Rendon, 354 
F.3d, 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
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high seas to its jurisdiction. . . .  Jurisdiction exists solely as a 
consequence of the vessel’s status as stateless.”117   
B.  Due Process Challenges 
The void-for-vagueness challenge centered primarily on the phrases: 
“semi-submersible vessel” and “intent to evade.”118  Saac and Ibarguen-
Mosquera appellants asserted that those phrases are vague and subject to 
“arbitrary enforcement”: 119 
[T]here is no intuitive limitation on the meaning of the modifier 
“most” as it refers to the hull and bulk and the amount 
underwater during operation.  Does “most” refer to more than 
half of the hull and bulk?  What is the denominator in the ratio 
that presumably would need to be utilized to assess the meaning 
of “most?”120 
However, the Ibarguen-Mosquera court cited to the facts of the case, 
common sense, and Webster’s Dictionary, among other sources, to 
conclude:   
                                            
 117. Id. (quoting Marino-Garcia, 697 F.2d at 1383). 
 118. Id. at 1380.  The DTVIA defines a semi-submersible as “any watercraft 
constructed or adapted to be capable of operating with most of its hull and bulk under the 
surface of the water.”  46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(f)(1) (West 2010) (emphasis added).   
Ibarguen-Mosquera also concluded that the phrase “intent to evade” is not vague and 
covers the appellant’s conduct:   
Defendants traveled in a Vessel that sat very low in the water, was painted ocean-
blue, and had no head-lights or signals.  Rather than using one of Colombia’s 
major ports to get the Vessel to sea, Defendants surreptitiously guided it down a 
small estuary near the Ecuadorian coast.  The Vessel bore no registration numbers 
or other markings.  It traveled more slowly in the day than at night, and was 
configured to create very little wake when moving and no wake when still.  The 
Vessel sank upon arrival of the Rescue. 
Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1380. 
 119. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1379-80.  
 120. Appellant Ibarguen-Mosquera’s Initial Brief, supra note 108, at 20.  The appellant 
brief continued:  “[t]he difficulty in assessing the meaning of this measure can be seen 
when trying to apply it to a vessel like an oil tanker.  An oil tanker, when laden with its 
cargo, rides very low in the water, and a good portion of its mass rides below the 
surface.”  Id. at 21 n.8.  See also Appellant’s Initial Brief at 26, United States v. 
Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-14476-0) [hereinafter 
Estubinan Appellant’s Brief].  One of the co-defendants in Ibarguen-Mosquera  asserted 
that “[t]here is no standard provided here to reign in policing of this statute, since, it gives 
law enforcement unbridled discretion, without minimal objective guidelines, to determine 
when any vessel is capable (as opposed actually) of operating in such as manner on the 
High Seas.”  Id. 
60 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
[T]he facts clearly show that this Vessel was operating only 4 to 
12 inches above the water while stationary and was nearly 
completely underwater while moving.  Since the Vessel was 
operating with the ‘greatest amount’ of its bulk underwater at the 
time of detection, it clearly had ‘features permitting’ it to do so. 
Therefore the phrase ‘semi-submersible vessel’ covers the 
Vessel.121 
Appellants further asserted that “[t]he ‘intent to evade’ element of 
the new offense is also problematic.  It is not even defined.”122   
Appellant’s arguments were not persuasive because of the totality of 
their conduct, which included the deceptive deployment of a stateless 
submersible and duplicitous operations.123   
C.  Burden Shifting Challenges 
The Estubinan defendants also argued that the DTVIA is 
unconstitutional because it “relieve[s] the Prosecutor (and the Coastguard 
[sic] and Navy) the Burden of Proving actual ‘Trafficking Amounts of 
Drugs’ . . . under the guise of making highly illegal presence aboard a 
‘semi-submersible vessel.’”124 Appellants then contended the DTVIA 
“effectively redefines a drug trafficking offense, presuming a defendant 
                                            
 121. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1380. 
 122. Appellant Ibarguen-Mosquera’s Initial Brief, supra note 107, at 21.  See also id. at 
22 (“‘[i]ntent to evade,’ an element of the new offense, is characterized by reference both 
to another element of the offense and to itself.  In other words, the new offense is circular 
in how it characterizes what is illegal – a person commits an offense if he is operating a 
semi-submersible (whatever that is) on the high seas without nationality with the intent to 
evade, and he has the intent to evade if he is operating a vessel resembling a semi-
submersible that is designed to avoid detection.  The statute is unconstitutionally vague, 
and this circularity denies the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”).  In a 
different case, Government counsel argued that “the terms ‘most’ and ‘capable of’ are 
terms of common understanding,” and asserted that the court should give them “their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended them 
to bear some different import. . . . [Moreover] these terms are ‘so simple and obvious 
they need no further explanation in the statute.’”  Brief of United States of America, 
United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, supra, note 9, at 33-4 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) and United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 
1978)).  Government counsel also noted “Congress has identified several indicia that 
‘may be considered, in the totality of the circumstances, to be prima facie evidence of 
intent to evade detection.’” Id. at 34.   
 123. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1381. 
 124. Estubinan Appellant’s Brief, supra note 120, at 29.  
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guilty if there are indicia he is drug trafficking, unconstitutionally 
shifting the burden to him to prove he was not. . . .”125 
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court noted that 
the Constitution prohibits presuming an ingredient of an offense 
upon the proof of other facts, or shifting certain elements of an 
offense from an element to an affirmative defense.  The 
Constitution would therefore prohibit redefining an offense so 
that the absence of an element of the original crime becomes an 
affirmative defense.126 
The court held, however, that 
this provision does not shift the burden onto Appellants for at 
least two reasons.  First, that the design of the vessel can serve as 
prima facie evidence of intent to evade merely means that such 
evidence is legally sufficient to find such an intent, and does not 
shift the burden of persuasion onto Appellants. The government 
is still charged with convincing the fact-finder that the defendant 
intended to evade detection. Second, there is much more 
evidence here of “intent to evade” than merely the fact that the 
Vessel is semi-submersible:  the Vessel’s camouflage, its lack of 
headlights, its surreptitious route to the ocean, and its 
statelessness.”127  
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court anchored its holding primarily on the 
fact that the DTVIA is not a drug-trafficking statute.128  It is, after all, the 
DTVIA’s text, not its title, which provides the substantive provisions.  
As Government counsel noted in their Campaz-Guerrero brief, 
“[d]espite . . . [the DTVIA’s] popular name, . . . section 2285 is not a 
drug trafficking statute, and it does not prohibit drug trafficking.”129    
DTVIA’s national security underpinnings and its focus on the means 
of conveyance, not the cargo, were dispositive for the court: 
While it is probably true that the DTVIA was enacted in part to 
deal with the problem of losing drug evidence to the sinking of 
                                            
 125. Id. at 28. 
 126. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1381. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Brief of United States of America, United States v. Campaz-Guerrero, supra note 
9, at 39 (citing United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80 (4th Cir. 1981) (referencing the 
Drug Kingpin Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006), which “refer[s] to ‘any person’” rather than 
just “the dominant person in a conspiracy.”). 
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semi-submersibles, the DTVIA is not a drug-trafficking statute.  
In enacting the DTVIA, Congress chose to prohibit an entirely 
new evil, not to redefine an old one.130 
The DTVIA prosecutions over the past three years have 
demonstrated the value of legislation targeted against a transnational 
threat.  Closing the loophole that previously existed regarding 
submersibles is operationally beneficial and judicially sound.  It is 
probable that those prosecuted under the DTVIA will continue to 
challenge its constitutionality, though the opinions in Saac and Ibarguen-
Mosquera are precedential Eleventh Circuit cases and will provide 
important guidance for other circuits.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Transnational criminal threats are corrosive to stability, national 
security, and governance.  The deployment of submersibles by TCOs 
poses a threat not just to the United States, but to all nations.  While 
currently believed to be only carrying drugs and arms, TCOs could 
transport considerably more dangerous items, such as WMD, or even use 
the SPSS itself as a weapon.  As such, Congress rightly criminalized 
stateless submersibles operating internationally with the intent to evade 
detection.   
Appellate cases in 2011 affirming convictions under the DTVIA 
have demonstrably added to the law’s authoritative force.131  
Nevertheless, defendants in subsequent prosecutions may very well 
revisit issues related to vagueness and burden shifting, among others.  
Neither contention should have legal resonance when the underlying 
conduct remains operating a stateless submersible internationally with an 
intent to evade detection.   
As TCOs modify their tactics with potentially new platforms, courts 
may have to address whether those vessels fall under the ambit of the 
DTVIA.  Policy questions include how U.S. agencies will prioritize the 
SPSS threat, the development of use of force guidance, potential efforts 
to recover scuttled vessels/cargo, fiscal issues and ensuring there are 
consequences for failing to heave to.   
As states explore how to address maritime threats most effectively, it 
is important to assess them in the context of a continually changing 
environment, with the expectation that criminals and terrorists will 
                                            
 130. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1381.  
 131. See infra Part V. 
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develop new methods and new technology.  An at-sea presence will 
remain critical to interdiction and apprehension efforts, but robust legal 
capabilities are also critical.132  A gap that existed between an emergent 
transnational threat and the law was closed with the enactment of the 
DTVIA in 2008.  As the transportation of narcotics and other illicit cargo 
continues to evolve, it will be critical that laws similarly evolve to 
support operations and ensure judicial accountability.   
 
  
                                            
 132. See CRAIG H. ALLEN, MARITIME COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 80 (2007) (“Maritime interception and enforcement actions are an 
indispensable element in maintaining order in the oceans.  No one has yet suggested a 
feasible substitute for an adequate and effective at-sea monitoring and enforcement 
presence.”). 
       
